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Abstract 
This paper  provides new  evidence on  the issue of  Federal  Reserve  System 
credibility by examining the response pattern of  asset prices to the weekly M1 
announcements  under  different operating procedures  and monetary  policy regimes 
in  the September  1977  to  December  1984 period.  It  is  found  that the response 
of  asset prices to  money  surprises represented revisions of inflationary 
expectations  in  the pre-October 6,  1979,  period and  that the Federal  Reserve 
was  not credible.  On  the contrary,  the response of  asset prices to  money 
surprises represented  revisions of  real interest rates in the post-October 6, 
1979,  period and  the Federal  Reserve  was  credible.  Furthermore,  the evidence 
shows  that the October 1982  return to an  interest-rate-smoothing procedure did 
not result in  any  loss of  the System's  credibility,  suggesting that 
credibility, once  attained,  does  not depend  on  the short-run operating 
procedure. 
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This paper  provides evidence  on  the issue of the Federal  Reserve  System's 
credibility by  examining the market's reaction to  the weekly  MI announcements 
under  alternative monetary  policy regimes  and  different  operating procedures. 
Federal  Reserve  crediblity is defined in  this study as  the market's perception 
of the System's  commitment  to  its goal  of  price stability.  The  degree  of 
credibility depends  on  the past behavior  of  policymakers and  on  the 
institutions of  policy. 
The  Federal  Reserve  formulates and  executes monetary  policy through  the 
use  of annual  targets for the monetary  aggregates.  The  market's  perception of 
Federal  Reserve  credibility depends  on  the System's  rate of  success  in  hitting 
past targets.  This would  not necessarily be  true if there were  large shifts 
in  money  demand  and if the "target misses" offset shifts in  money  demand.  The 
test,  of course,  is whether  or not the inflation goals  were  achieved. 
The  institutions of  policy include the short-run operating procedure,  the 
instruments and  the feedback rules used  to  achieve monetary  targets.  The 
institutions of  pol  icy determine  the degree  of flexi  bi  1  i  ty  pol  icymakers  have 
to  deviate from announced  plans.  Institutions that provide flexibility  allow 
the Federal  Reserve  to  address  goals other than price stability. 
Credibility becomes  an  issue when  the Federal  Reserve  deviates from its 
announced  inflation goal  in the pursuit of  other goals.  The  lack of 
credibility becomes  especially important  when  the System embarks  on  a policy 
of  disinflation.  If  announcements  of lower money  growth and  lower  future 
inflation are widely believed,  then  there are good  reasons  to think that the 
real costs of  a disinflation policy will be  lower. 
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Cukierman  and Meltzer  (1982)  argue  that "...credibility  may  be  low either 
because  of systematic  differences between  announced  and  actual  policy or 
because  of  poor  implementation of the policy."  Meltzer  (1978)  argues  that the 
lack of  efficient operating procedures  for controlling the money  stock has 
contributed to  low credibility of  Federal  Reserve  policy announcements.  He 
suggests  that better procedures  for controlling money  would  improve  the 
System's  credibility. 
This  study examines  the Federal  Reserve's  credibility as  revealed in 
market reaction to  the M1  announcement.  Our  sample  period,  September  1977  to 
December  1984,  includes  significant changes  in  monetary  policy regimes  and 
operating procedures.  We  compare  and  analyze  the pattern of  response of 
short-  and  long-term interest rates and  of spot  and  forward exchange  rates to 
the money  announcements  before and  after each  of  the changes  in  operating 
procedures. 
Hardouvelis  (1984)  examined  the response  of asset prices to  the MI 
announcement  for the September  1977  to  June  1982  period.  He  concluded  that 
the Federal  Reserve  did gain credibility in the post-October  6,  1979,  period, 
but that it  fell short of establishing full credibility.  We  provide new 
evidence on  the issue of credibility during the earlier period of  federal 
funds  targeting and  extend  the evidence  to  include  the experience  with the 
most recent change  in the operating procedure,  the switch to  the borrowed 
reserve targeti  ng. 
We  present  significant evidence  that weekly  surprises  in  M1  led to 
revisions of inflation expectations  during the pre-1979 period,  indicating 
that policy was  not credible.  As  far as  we  know,  this is the only significant 
evidence,  outside of episodes  of hyperinflation,  to  show  that inflation 
expectations  were  revised in  response  to  new  information about monetary growth. 
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Evidence  is  presented to show  that the October  6,  1979,  change  in 
operating procedures  was  accompanied by a fundamental  change  in  the market's 
perception of  the System's  commitment  to  ending inflation.  We  show  that the 
response of short-  and  long-term asset prices to  MI surprises represent 
revisions of real  interest rates during this period and  that the Federal 
Reserve  was  credible.  Furthermore,  it  is shown  that the Federal  Reserve's 
decision to  return to  an  interest-rate-smoothing procedure  in  October 1982  did 
not lead to  a  loss of credibility,  at least not through the end  of  1984. 
I. Policy Regimes,  Operating Procedures,  and  the MI Announcements 
Extensive research on money  stock announcements  over  the last five years 
has  led to  a predominance  of  two hypotheses  to  explain the market's response 
to  MI announcements.  The  first hypothesis asserts that a  surprise in  the 
money  stock announcement  contains  information  about  future  money  supply 
growth.  Cornell  (1983a)  calls it  the expected  inflation hypothesis,  in  which 
a money  stock surprise is expected to  be  incorporated  in  future levels of the 
money  stock.  The  expected  inflation hypothesis  can  be  stated as  the 
hypothesis  that policy is not credible.  As  a result,  an  unexpected  increase 
in the money  stock  leads  to  an  increased  inflation premium  in  market  interest 
rates (the Fisher  effect) and  to  a depreciation of  the dollar against major 
foreign currencies. ' 
The  second  hypothesis  asserts  that money  stock surprises contain 
information about money  demand  shocks.  This  is called the policy anticipation 
hypothesis.  This  hypothesis,  developed by Urich and  Wachtel  (1981>,  Urich 
(19821,  Roley  and  Walsh  (19831,  Nichols,  Small  and  Webster  (1983),  and  Engel 
and  Frankel  (1984),  is based  on  the assumptions  that prices adjust sluggishly 
and  that the Federal  Reserve  uses  a partial adjustment  procedure  to  achieve 
its  monetary  targets.  An  increase in  money  demand  thus  creates a  liquidity 
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shortage  that dissipates gradually over  time.  During the transition period, 
real  interest rates must  rise to  clear the money  market.  The  policy 
anticipations hypothesis assumes  that policy is credible.  The  public expects 
deviations of  the money  stock from the preannounced  targets to  be  completely 
offset, but only after an  extended period of time.' 
Cornell  (1983b),  Hardouvelis  (1984>,  and  Loeys  (1984)  combine  these  two 
hypotheses.  The  combination hypothesis  states that short-term policy is 
credible (the market believes the System  is committed  to  the annual  target), 
but long-term policy is  not (the market  is not convinced  that the System  will 
continue to  choose  targets over  the long run that guarantee price stability). 
These  studies argue  that the liquidity effect dominates  in the short run and 
that the inflation premium effect dominates  in the long run.  Following a 
positive surprise in  the money  stock,  short-term nominal  interest rates rise 
because  the market  expects  the Federal  Reserve  to  partially offset the 
deviations above  the money  supply target.  However,  because  the System  is  not 
expected  to  offset the money  stock  surprise completely,  inflationary 
expectations  and  long-term interest rates rise. 
The  pattern of  response of interest rates to  money  stock announcements  is, 
in  principle,  consistent with all these hypotheses.  The  inability to 
distinguish between  alternative hypotheses  based  on  the response  of  the 
interest rates alone has  led researchers  to  examine  the response  of  other 
asset prices as  a  source of  additional  information.  Cornell  (1983b1,  Engel 
and  Frankel  (1984>,  and  Hardouvelis  (1984)  show  that one  can  distinguish 
whether  the response  of  market  interest rates to  a  surprise in the weekly 
announcement  of  MI is  due  to  a  change  in  the real  interest rate,  or to  a 
change  in the inflation premium,  by observing the simultaneous response of the 
foreign exchange  value of  the dollar. 
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If an  increase in  the market  interest rate is accompanied by a 
depreciation of the dollar,  the increase in  market  interest rates is  due  to  an 
increase  in the inflation premium.  If an  increase  in  the market  interest rate 
is accompanied  by  an  appreciation of  the dollar,  the increase in  market 
interest rates i  s due  to  an  increase in the real  interest rate. 
If real interest rates rise on  the announcement  of  an  unexpected increase 
in the money  stock,  we  conclude  that policy is credible.  If  only nominal 
rates rise,  then we  conclude  that current policy is viewed  as  inflationary; 
that is,  policy is not credible. 
In  this paper,  we  distinguish between monetary policy regimes  and 
operating procedures.  A  pol  ic.y regime  change  is  defined  as  a  change  in the 
objective function of the policy authority.  If the objective function is  a 
weighted average of  different goals,  then the policy change  may  be  a shift in 
the relative weights  for the different goals. 
A  change  in the operating procedure  is defined as  a change  in  the 
technique employed  by monetary authorities to  achieve  the annual  targets. 
Many  different operating procedures  could be  used  to  achieve  the same 
objectives;  also,  one  operating procedure could be  used  to  achieve  very 
different objectives.  Changes  in  operating procedures may  lead to  changes  in 
the response of short-term asset prices to  money  stock  surprise^.^  However, 
there is not likely to  be  a significant change  in  the response  of long-term 
asset prices to  a surprise change  in  the money  stock,  unless  there is  a 
perceived change  in  the objective function of the Federal  Reserve  System. 
Our  findings show  that the response  of short-term asset prices supports 
the expected  inflation hypothesis  in  the pre-October 6,  1979,  period of 
federal funds  targeting,  but that it  is  more  consistent with the policy 
anticipation hypothesis  in  the post-October 6,  1979,  period.  We  conclude  that 
the October  6,  1979,  change  in  procedures  was  also a fundamental  change  in  the 
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results comes  from the foreign exchange market.  Following a positive money 
stock  surprise,  the spot and  forward values of  the dollar against the German 
mark  depreciated  in the pre-October 6,  1979,  period and  they appreciated  in 
the post-October  6,  1979  period.  Based  on  this evidence,  we  argue  that the 
October  6,  1979,  announcement  was  not only a change  in  the operating 
procedure,  but also a fundamental  change  in  policy. 
The  nonborrowed  reserve procedure was  officially abandoned  in  October 
1982.  Since  that time,  the Federal  Reserve  has  used  a borrowed  reserve 
targeting procedure.  The  borrowed reserve procedure may  be  described as  an 
i  nterest-rate smoothing procedure.  However,  the return to  an i  nterest-rate 
smoothing procedure does  not necessarily mean  that the System  has  returned to 
an  inflationary policy regime.  The  response of  asset prices following an 
unexpected  increase in  MI in  the most  recent period indicates that the Federal 
Reserve  was  able to  return to  an  interest-smoothing operating procedure  in 
October  1982  without any  apparent loss of  credibility. 
Furthermore,  we  offer an  explanation in the next section for  two puzzles 
in the  literature related to  the response  of long-term interest rates to  money 
stock announcements.  The  first  puzzle,  raised by Cornell  (1983a,b>  and 
Hardouvelis  (19841,  is  why,  if the pre-October 1979  period were  one  of 
inflationary monetary policy,  longer-term forward interest rates did not 
respond  to  money  stock  surprises  in the pre-October 1979  period. 
The  second  puzzle is why  the response  by  long-term interest rates was  so 
strong after October  6,  1979.  Roley  and  Walsh  (1983)  argue  that the reaction 
of long-term interest rates to  money  stock surprises represents changes  in  the 
real interest rate.  A  positive money  surprise generates  anticipation of 
future tightening of  money  growth which,  assuming  slow price adjustments, 
raises short-term real interest rates via the liquidity effect and  long-term 
real rates via the expectations  theory of  the term structure. 
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The  problem with this explanation is that it  cannot  explain the strong 
reaction of long-term forward interest rates unless we  assume  that the 
liquidity effect lasts for several  years.  On  the other hand,  Cornell  (1983a>, 
Hardouvelis  (1984),  and  Loeys  (1984)  argue  in  favor of the expected  inflation 
hypothesis.  The  major  evidence  in support of  this hypothesis  has  been 
Hardouvelis'  finding that the expected  future  value of  the dollar against 
major  foreign currencies five years ahead  depreciates following a positive 
money  stock surprise.  Hardouvelis  constructed the expected  future spot 
exchange  rates by  assuming  that the open  interest-rate parity condition holds 
between  the rates of return on  various Euromarket  securities and  on  the rate 
of  return on  Eurodollar  securities maturing in  five years. 
There  are  two general  criticisms of these  findings.  First, open 
interest-rate parity is an  arbitrage condition and  does  not depend  on  whether 
changes  in  nominal  interest rates are due  to  changes  in the expected real rate 
differential or to  changes  in the expected  inflation differential.  If the 
response  of the five-year Eurodollar rate reflects a change  in the real 
interest rate,  then the depreciation of  the dollar obtained by Hardouvelis 
represents an  expected  real depreciation of  the dollar needed  to  equalize the 
rates of  return across  securities denominated  in  different currencies.  This 
result cannot be  used  to  distinguish between  the expected  inflation hypothesis 
and  the pol  icy anticipation hypothesi s. 
Second,  the argument  that the significant  response  to  long forward rates 
in the post-October 1979  period reflects revisions of the inflationary premium 
is  not satisfactory.  The  period before October  1979  was  more  inflationary, 
yet the strong reaction of long-term interest rates is  obtained in  the 
post-October 1979  period.  If Hardouvelis'  hypothesis  is  correct,  this finding 
implies that the market  was  more  concerned  about  the Federal  Reserve  pursuing 
inflationary policies in  the post-October  1979  period than in  the pre-October 
1979  period. 
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11.  Empirical  Results 
The  empirical  results are organized  in  three sections corresponding  to  the 
Federal  Reserve's  different operating procedures.  Before describing the 
results,  we  briefly review the data and  the empirical  model  used  in  this 
analysis. 
The  Data.  M1  is the figure  first  published by  the Federal  Reserve  in  the 
H.6  press release.  The  expected change  in  MI  is calculated using the median 
of a survey  taken by Money  Market  Services.'  The  expected changes  (MMSP) 
are in  billions of  dollars.  The  expected  change  in  MI is  calculated as: 
EM,  =  log (Mlt-1  +  MMSPt)  -  log (Mlt-I), 
where t refers to  the week  of the announcement  rather than  the statement  week 
for which  MI was  calculated.  The  unexpected  change  in  MI is calculated as: 
UMt  =  log (MI,)  -  log (MI,-1  +  MMSPt). 
We  have  used  first-published numbers  rather than revised numbers  in  making 
these calculations.  This amounts  to  treating the revision as  an  unexpected 
change. 
We  used  the MI series that was  published in  the H.6  release.  When  the 
definition of  MI changed,  our measure  changed.  Overlapping data were  used  to 
splice the series in  early 1980,  when  the Federal  Reserve  changed  the 
definition of  M1  to  include other checkable  deposits. 
The  interest rates and  exchange  rates come  from  the data banks  of  Data 
Resources  Inc.  The  original source  for the interest rates is  the H.15 
release.  The  domestic  interest rates included in this study are the 
coupon-equivalent yield on  three-  and  twelve-month Treasury  bills; and  the 
constant maturity yield on  three-year,  seven-year,  and  thirty-year Treasury 
bonds.  We  have  also calculated implied forward rates using the formula in 
Shiller, Campbell,  and  Schoenholtz  (1983). 
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examine  the reactions of the dollarlmark spot rate,  the three-month 
dollarlmark forward rate,  and  the twelve-month dollarlmark forward rate to 
money  stock announcements.  The  exchange  rates are expressed  as  bids 
reflecting opening prices in the New  York markets.  Rates  are quotes  in  U.S. 
terms  (dollars per  deutschemark).  The  change  is  measured  as  the first 
difference of the logari  thm. 
Since  the H.6  release (Money  Announcement)  was  made  on  various days 
throughout  the sample  period,  we  collected daily data.  A 
"before-announcement" rate was  taken as  the  last available value before  the 
announcement.  The  "after-announcement" rate was  taken as  the first  available 
value after the announcement.  There  are always  at least 24-hours between  the 
"before" and  "after" quote.  This  leaves  time for  other factors  to  affect the 
asset price.  The  major  effect  of this procedure  is to  reduce  the R
2  in the 
estimate of equation  (1)  (below).  However,  there is no reason for the 
parameters of  equation  (1)  to  be  biased unless  these other factors are 
correlated with the surprise in  the money  stock announcement. 
The  Model.  The  announcement  studies are based  on  the efficient market 
hypothesis that states that the current asset price will reflect all publicly 
available information.  Changes  in  prices should reflect only new 
information.  The  empirical  model  used  in studies of  money  stock announcements 
takes  the following form: 
(1)  AAlt  =  a,  +  a,  UMt  +  a,  EM,  +  e,, 
where 
AA,,  =  change  in  the i  th asset price from before the 
announcement  to  after the announcement. 
UMt  =  surprise in  the money  stock announcement  at time t, 
EMt  =  expected  change  in the money  stock at time t, and 
e  =  random  error. 
Under  the efficient market hypothesis,  if  expectations are rational,  then 
a,  and  az wi  11  be  zero,  and  the error term wi  11  be  random.  If the money 
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be  significant.  In  other words,  under  the efficient market hypothesis,  only 
the unanticipated component  of the MI announcement  should influence  AAlt 
because  the price before  the announcement  should already reflect all relevant 
publicly available information. 
The  full sample  period starts on  September  28,  1977,  and  ends  on December 
20,  1984.  The  model  was  estimated separately for three different subperiods: 
the federal  funds  rate operating procedure from the beginning of the sample 
period until October  6,  1979,  the nonborrowed  reserve operating procedure 
period from October  6,  1979,  until October  5,  1982,  and  the borrowed  reserve 
operating procedure period from October  12,  1982,  to  December  31,  1984. 
Revised Expectations  for MI.  Preliminary estimates of  equation  (1)  for 
different interest rates yielded coefficients  for  the survey expectation 
measure,  a,,  that were  statistically different  from zero.  Rather  than 
conclude  that the markets  were  inefficient in  processing this information,  we 
followed the Roley (1983)  methodology,  with a modification suggested  by Hein 
(1985>,  to  improve  the survey  forecast by accounting for  the new  information 
released between  the time the survey  is taken and  the time of the money  stock 
announcement. 
The  survey used  in this study was  conducted on  Tuesdays.  A  revised 
expectation measure  is constructed  that reflects the availability of  new 
information from Tuesday  to  Thursday or Friday.  The  revised expectation 
measure  is  defined as  the fitted value of the regression of the change  in  M1 
on  a  constant,  on  the expected  change  in  MI,  and  the change  in  two  interest 
rates:  the  three-month Treasury bill and  the thirty-year Treasury bond.  The 
change  in interest rates is  measured  from  the end of the day  the survey median 
is published  to  the market  close on  the day  of the announcement  using the H.15 
as  the  source  for our  interest rates).  We  presume  that changes  in these  two 
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interest rates capture most  of  the relevant new  information between  the day  of 
the survey and  the money  stock announcement. 
Following Hein (19851,  the coefficient on expected MI is  constrained  to 
unity.  The  residuals from the regression represent the surprises  in  the money 
stock.  This equation was  estimated separately for each  subperiod  and  the 
results are reported in  table 1.  On  average,  the change  in  the three-month 
bill yield and  the thirty-year bond  yield add  new  information to  the survey 
measure,  but the low  R2  signifies that their contribution is  rather small. 
It  appears  that only the change  in the  long-term yield provided new 
information during the September  29,  1977  to  October  5,  1979,  period. 
Colinearity between  the long and  short rates results in  low  t-statistics 
for the two  periods after October  1979.  We  decided  to  include both rates 
because  doing so  led to smaller prediction errors even  though  the t-statistics 
are low.  When  included separately,  each  of  the interest rates was  found to  be 
statistically significant. 
The  empirical  results presented in  this section are based  on  estimates of 
the parameters  of equation  (1).  The  revised expectation measu're  is used  to 
construct the expected  changes  in  the money  stock.  The  money  stock 
announcement  was  made  at 4:15  or 4:30 p.m.  E.S.T.  Estimates  of a,  and  az 
are reported tables 2  and  3.  Results using domestic  interest rates are  shown 
in the top blocks,  implied forward rates in  the middle blocks,  and  foreign 
exchange  rates in the bottom blocks of tables 2 and  3.  The  estimates of  a,, 
the coefficient on  the expected  change  in  MI,  are  shown  in  table 3.  The 
majority of the coefficients are not statistically different from zero with a 
few exceptions.  It  appears  that accounting for the new  information,  which  is 
available after the survey  is taken,  but before  the time of  the money  stock 
announcement,  improves  the efficiency of  the survey forecast. 
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Tests  for Structural Shift.  We  have  assumed  throughout  that there were 
structural  shifts each  time the Federal  Reserve  changed  its  operating 
procedures.  We  have  constructed Wald  Statistics to test whether or not there 
was  a change  in  parameters  every time there was  a change  in  the operating 
procedure.  This is  a large-sample  test that was  used  instead of  a Chow 
test because  we  have  unequal  sample  sizes and  heteroskedasticity  in  the 
residuals of the  interest-rate equations.  The  stability tests are reported in 
table 4. 
September  1977  to  October  1979:  The  Expected Inflation Hypothesis  Reconsidered 
Before October  1979,  the Federal  Reserve  used  an  interest-rate targeting 
procedure  to  achieve  the monetary  targets.  Surprises  in  the money  stock were 
automatically accommodated  in  the short run.  For  the years of  our analysis, 
1977  to  1979,  these deviations accumulated  on  the plus side and  carried MI to 
or above  the upper  limit  of  the target range.  At year-end,  the Federal 
Reserve  based  the next calendar  year's monetary  targets on  the actual 
fourth-quarter average  level  for MI,  allowing the targets to  drift upward  over 
time.  During this period,  money  grew  at or above  the top of the  target ranges 
and  inflation accelerated. 
In  spite of  this record of  accelerating money  growth and  accelerating 
inflation,  studies by Roley and  Walsh  (19831,  Urich (1982>,  and Urich and 
Wachtel  (1981)  conclude  that the response  of short-term interest rates to  the 
unexpected change  in  M1  can  be  explained by  the policy anticipations 
hypothesis.  Only Cornell  (1983a)  argues  that the expected  inflation 
hypothesis explains  the response of short-term rates in this period before 
October  1979. 
The  results from the pre-October 1979  period,  presented in table 1, 
support  the expected  inflation hypothesis.  The  estimate of a,  was  positive 
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and  significant at a  5  percent critical level for  all of the domestic  interest 
rates.  All of  the implied forward rates responded positively to  the money 
stock  surprises,  but only in  the case  of the three-month-ahead,  nine-month 
rate was  the response  significantly different from  zero at the 5  percent  level. 
The  interest-rate results as  such  do  not tell us  anything about  the 
credibility of  policy.  To  decide whether  or not the market  viewed  policy as 
credible,  we  look at the reaction in  the foreign exchange  market.  The  dollar 
depreciated relative to  the deutschemark  following a  positive money  stock 
surpri  se. 
The  response  in  the spot and  three-month-forward market  was  not 
statistically significant.  However,  the estimated response  in  the 
twelve-month forward exchange  market,  following a positive surprise in the 
money  stock announcement,  was  statistically significant at the 5  percent 
level.  These  findings provide support for the  hypothesis  that policy was  not 
credible before October  1979. 
When  we  look only at the last year before  the October  1979  change  in 
policy regime,  when  inflation was  accelerating,  we  see  a much  stronger 
response  in the spot-and forward-exchange markets.  In  the year before  the 
Federal  Reserve's  policy  change,  there was  a  statistically significant 
depreciation of  all exchange  rates following a positive money  stock  surprise. 
For  instance,  the simultaneous  rise in  the three-month Treasury  bill and 
depreciation of the three-month  forward exchange  rate implies that the rise in 
the Treasury bill was  due  to  an  increase in  inflation  expectations  as  posited 
by Cornell  (1983b)  and  not due  to  the policy anticipation hypothesis as 
suggested by  Roley and  Walsh  (19831,  Urich (19821,  and  Urich and  Wachtel 
(1981). 
The  unanswered  question is why  long-term interest rates did not respond  to 
the surprise in  MI over  this period.  One  explanation  is that the variance of 
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expected money  growth and  expected  inflation rose as  the forecast horizon 
lengthened.  For  example,  if policy led to  a money  supply growth  that had 
characteristics of  a random  walk,  the variance of expected  inflation and 
expected money  growth would  grow  with the forecast horizon.  At long horizons, 
the variance of expected money  growth  would be  so  large that a typical  weekly 
change  in the money  stock would  be  small  relative to  the market's perception 
of the  standard deviation of the expected  inflation forecast.  Therefore,  one 
would  expect  no  significant reaction of long-term rates to  a weekly  change  in 
MI. 
October  1979  to  October  1982:  The  Policy Regime  Change 
In  the post-October 1979  period,  the Federal  Reserve  announced  that it  was 
placing more  emphasis  on  reducing inflation.  To  lend credibility to  the 
announcement,  the System  also switched to  a reserve-based operating 
procedure.  The  nonborrowed  reserve procedure  induced  large interest-rate 
changes  in  response  to  deviations of  money  from target.  Under  this procedure, 
it  appeared  that the Federal  Reserve  was  trying to  reverse deviations of  MI 
from the target path more  quickly.  Thus,  the change  in  procedures  lent 
credibility to  the System's  announcement  that it  had  switched  to  a policy of 
disinflation. 
During the period of the nonborrowed  reserve operating procedure,  the 
reactions of all domestic  interest rates were  much  greater than before.  In 
the earlier period,  a 1 percent positive surprise in  the money  stock  led to  a 
seven  basis-point increase  in the three-month Treasury  bill rate and  to  a 1.5 
basis point increase in  the thirty-year Treasury bond  rate.  In  the period of 
nonborrowed  reserve  targeting,  the reactions of these rates were  considerably 
stronger,  36  and  11.5  basis points,  respectively. 
There  was  also a dramatic  change  in the response  in  exchange markets.  The 
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dollar appreciated  sharply against  the deutschmark  in spot and  forward markets 
following a positive money  stock announcement.  This was  a sharp reversal from 
the earlier period.  Structural  stability tests are presented in  the first 
column  of table 4.  These  results show  a significant change  in  structure for 
all equations,  except for the seven-year  ahead,  twenty-three-year 
implied-forward interest rate. 
In  sensitivity tests using moving regressions,  we  found  that the 
structural shift occurred very quickly,  within weeks  of the change  in 
operating procedures.  This result indicates that the Federal  Reserve  can  gain 
credibility very quickly with a change  in  operating procedures,  even  after a 
long period of  missing pre-announced targets and  accelerating inflation. 
These  results have  be'en presented by others.  Engel  and  Frankel  (1984)  and 
Roley  and Walsh  (1983)  argue  in  favor  of  the policy anticipations hypothesis. 
Under  nonborrowed  reserve targeting,  an  exogenous  money-demand  shock  will 
automatical ly  force more  banks  to  go  to  the discount window.  This 
money-demand  shock  will be  completely offset if the Federal  Reserve  maintains 
its nonborrowed  reserve target.  Therefore,  given sluggish price adjustment,  a 
positive money  stock  surprise generates  anticipations of future excess  money 
demand.  This excess  demand  will raise short-term real  interest rates via the 
liquidity effect and  long-term real  interest rates via the expectations  theory 
of  the term structure.  Engel  and  Frankel  (1984)  support  this hypothesis  for 
the period of  nonborrowed  reserve targeting with evidence  from the foreign 
exchange  market. 
While observers generally expected  short-term rates to  respond more 
quickly to  deviations of M1  from target,  most  were  surprised at the strength 
of the reaction by  long-term rates.  The  puzzle in  this period is  why  the 
longer-term,  implied-forward interest rates responded  to the weekly money 
stock announcements.  Neither the expected  liquidity-effect explanation nor 
the expected  inflation hypothesis  is entirely satisfactory. 
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interest rate.  In  the conventional  view,  which underlies most  of the 
published empirical  work  in this area,  the process  generating the real 
interest rate has  a deterministic trend.  If the real  interest rate is  not 
treated as  a constant in  the short run,  then it  is assumed  to  return to  some 
"normal",  deterministic trend in  the long run.  Under  this view,  long-term 
real  interest rates should not respond  to  weekly  surprises  in  the money  stock. 
In  the alternative view,  the process  generating the real  interest rate is 
assumed  to  have  a stochastic trend.  In  general,  shocks  that affect the real 
interest rate will have  both temporary  and  permanent  components. "  Market 
participants will continually revise their expectations about  the term 
structure of  real  interest rates as  information about real shocks  becomes 
available.  The  real  shocks  that affect expected  real interest rates will also 
affect short-run movements  in the money  stock.  When  monetary  policy is 
credible,  and  the variance of  money  supply  shocks  is small  relative to  the 
variance of  real shocks,  market  participants will perceive unexpected  changes 
in the money  stock as  reflecting real  shocks  and  revise expected  real  interest 
rates accordingly. 
Both Seigel  (1985)  and  Walsh  (1985)  present models  in which  the long-term 
real interest rates respond  to the MI announcement.  In  both cases,  the 
long-term real interest rate effect occurs because  stochastic  shocks  to  real 
output may  persist indefinitely.  Litterman and  Weiss  (1985)  and  Nelson  and 
Plosser  (1982)  present empirical  support  for  the notion that real output and 
real interest rates may  be  more  accurately represented by  stochastic rather 
than deterministic trends.  Holland  (1984)  provides  supporting evidence  for 
the hypothesis  that real interest rates across  the term structure tend to  move 
together.  Using survey measures  of inflation expectations,  he  shows  that the 
one- and  ten-year expected real interest rates are nearly equal  and  tend to 
move  together. 
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October  1982  to  December  1984:  Pol  icy Remains  Credible 
There  was  another change  in  operating procedures  in  October  1982.  The 
Federal  Reserve  switched  from nonborrowed reserve  targeting to  borrowed 
reserve targeting,  which  is  an  interest-rate-smoothing procedure.  This period 
is interesting,  because it  allows us  to  test whether  the change  in  the 
operating procedure  can  be  viewed  as  a  change  in  the policy regime.  After 
October  1982,  the System  began  to  target borrowed  reserves.  If market 
participants perceived  this change  as  only a  technical  change,  with no 
implications for the monetary policy regime,  only the response of short-term 
interest rates should have  been  affected.  There  should have  been  no 
significant change  in  the response of longer-term asset prices. 
As  shown  in table 2, the pattern of response  of  asset prices to money 
stock  innovations  in the post-October 1982  period was  similar to  the pattern 
of  response observed  in the post-October 6,  1979,  period.  The  main difference 
is that the short-term interest rate response  became  weaker.  This result is 
consistent with a change  in  short-run operating procedures  with no  change  in 
the public's perception of  the Federal  Reserve's  commitment  to  the inflation 
goal . 
The  stability tests reported in  the center column  of table 4  show  that 
there was  a  statistically significant change  in the parameters of the 
equations for the short-term interest rates but not for the long-term rates or 
for the exchange  rates.  Also,  the response  of asset prices did not return to 
the pattern that prevailed in the pre-October  1979  period.  We  have  compared 
the models  from the two periods of  interest-rate-smoothing.  As  shown  in table 
4,  there is a  significant difference between  the market's  perception of  policy 
in the early period and  its  perception in  this latest period.  Only in the 
case of the three-month treasury bill and  the thirty-year bond  can  we  not 
reject the hypothesis of  no-change  in  structure (see  the third column  of table 
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4).  Evidently,  market participants believed the Federal  Reserve  would 
maintain a disinflationary policy despite its returning to  an 
interest-rate-smoothing procedure. 
111.  Conclusions 
We  have  presented evidence  to  show  that the policy regime  change  in 
October  1979  led to  a fundamental  change  in the way  market participants 
perceived the weekly M1  announcement.  Before October  1979,  unexpected  changes 
in  MI were  expected  to  lead to  permanent  changes  in the money  stock. 
Inflation expectations and  nominal  interest rates rose in  response  to  an 
unexpected increase  in  M1  while the foreign exchange  value of  the dollar 
depreciated.  After October  1979,  the weekly  announcement  of  M1  was  perceived 
to  reflect real shocks  as  real  interest rates were  revised upward  and  the 
foreign exchange  value of the dollar appreciated in  response  to  an  unexpected 
increase  in  MI. 
We  find that there was  a  structural shift in  the models  for short-term 
interest rates every  time there was  a change  in  the short-run operating 
procedure.  There  was  a  structural shift in  all the models  following the 
October  1979  change  in  operating procedures,  indicating a  shift in  policy 
regime  as  well  as  in  operating procedure. 
There  was  no  shift in  the long-term interest rate equations or in the 
foreign exchange  rate equations  following the October  1982  change  in  operating 
procedures.  The  stability tests are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
Federal  Reserve's  credibility survived a return to  an  interest-rate-smoothing 
operating procedure  in  October 1982.  Thus,  we  have  shown  that while the 
short-run operating procedure  can  be  used  to  gain credibility quickly,  it  is 
not necessary  to  maintain this short-run procedure once  credibility has  been 
attai  ned. 
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1.  Roley  and  Walsh  (1983)  have  formally derived the relationship between 
charges  in  interest rates and money  stock  surprises under  the expected 
inflation hypothesis.  Engel  and  Frankel  (1984)  have  extended  the analysis to 
include  the exchange  rate. 
2.  Roley  and  Walsh  (1983)  have  employed  a controversial  test to  discriminate 
between  the expected  inflation hypothesis  and  the policy anticipations 
hypothesis  based  on  the correlations between  MI and  past surprises  in the 
weekly announcement  of  MI.  Roley and  Walsh  found  that past surprises in  MI 
were  completely offset by  the Federal  Reserve  in less than a year both pre- 
and  post-October  6,  1979.  They  interpret the decaying pattern of correlations 
between  log(M1)  and  past  surprises  in log(M1)  as  support for the policy 
anticipation hypothesis. 
3.  See  Engel  and  Frankel  (1984)  for a  theoretical  derivation of these 
results. 
4.  This  is because  the operating procedures  determine  the slope of the 
reserve  supply curve which,  in  turn,  determines whether  money  demand 
disturbances are absorbed  by changes  either in the quantity or in the price of 
reserves. 
5.  For  a  detailed discussion of this procedure  see  Wallich (1984)  and 
Gilbert (1985). 
6.  On  the other hand,  one  could say  that Hardouvelis  assumes  that the real 
rate of interest is constant. 
7.  We  thank Mark  Porter and  Money  Market Services  for generously providing 
the survey  data. 
8.  See  Roley (1983)  for a  discussion of  this issue. 
9.  When  the unrevised expectation measure  is used,  the estimated  values  of 
a,  are qua1 i  tatively similar to those  presented  in this paper.  The  main 
effect of  revising the M1  forecast  is to  reduce  the significance of  the 
estimated values of  az.  These  results are presented  in  Gavin and  Karamouzis 
(1984). 
10.  See  Silvey (1975>,  pp.  115-116. 
11.  See  Nelson and  Plosser  (1982)  for a  discussion of  deterministic versus 
stochastic trends  in  economic  data. 
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Best available copyTable  1  The  Revised Expectation of the Expected Money  Stock 
ALog(M11,  =  constant +  EM,  +  bl  AR3Mt  +  b,  AR30Y,  +  et.a 
F-  Durbi  n 
Period  Constant  b  r  b  2  iX  Stat.  Watson 
--  - 
Sep.  19,  1977 -  -0.0009  -0.2942  2.813  0.04  3.65  1.83 
Oct.  5,  1979  (-2.21 1  (-0.75)  (2.68) 
Oct.  6,  1979 -  0.0008  0.2102  0.361  0.09  9.08  2.09 
Oct.  5,  1982  (2.11)  (2.05)  (1.66) 
Oct.  12,  1982 -  0.0002  0.188  0.506  0.05  3.09  2.34 
Dec.  31,  1984  (0.78)  (0.63)  (1.59) 
a  Where 
EM,  =  log (MI,-1  +  MMSPt)  -  log (Mlt-11, 
AR3Mt  =  change  in  the  three-month Treasury bill yield from the 
time of the survey to the time of the MI announcement, 
AR30Yt  =  change  in  the thirty-year Treasury bond yield from the 
time of the survey to the time of the M1  announcement,  and 
e,  =  random error. 
The  t-statistics  are in  parentheses. 
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Best available copyTable 2  Impact of Money Stock Surprises on Asset Prices (a,) 
Operating target 
Federal funds  Non- 
9/78  to  9/77 to  borrowed  Borrowed 
Dependent variable  9/79  9/79  reserves  reserves 
3-month Treasury 
12-month Treasury 
3-year govt. bond 
7-year govt. bond 











Do1  1  ar  /mark 3-mon  th- 
forward exchange rate 
Dollarlmark 12-month- 
forward exchange rate 
NOTE:  The period of nonborrowed reserve targeting was September 1979 to 
September 1982; the period of borrowed reserve targeting was September 1982 to 
December 1984.  The t-statistics are shown in  parentheses. 
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Best available copyTable  3  Impact of Expected Money  Stock Changes  on  Asset Prices  (a,) 
Operating  target 
Federal  funds  Non- 
9/78  to  9/77  to  borrowed  Borrowed 
Dependent  variable  9/79  9/79  reserves  reserves 
3-month  Treasury 
12-month  Treasury 
3-year  govt.  bond 
7-year  govt.  bond 
30-year  govt.  bond 
9-month-forward rate 
3-months  ahead 
2-year-forward rate 
1-year  ahead 
4-year-forward rate 
3-years  ahead 
23-year-forward rate 
7-years  ahead 
Do1 larlmark spot 
exchange  rate 
Dollarlmark 3-month- 
forward exchange  rate 
Dollarlmark 12-month- 
forward exchange  rate 
NOTE:  The  period of nonborrowed  reserve  targeting was  September  1979  to 
September  1982;  the period of borrowed reserve  targeting was  September  1982  to 
December  1984.  The  t-statistics are  shown  in  parentheses. 
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a 
Federal  funds rate  Nonborrowed  Borrowed 
VS.  VS.  vs. 
Dependent variable  nonborrowed res.  borrowed  federal  funds 
3-month Treasury 
12-month Treasury 
3-year govt.  bond 
7-year govt.  bond 




1 -year a.head 
4-year-forward rate 
3-years ahead 




Dollarlmark 3-month-  13.78b 
forward exchange rate 
Dollarlmark 12-month-  14.74b 
forward exchange rate 
a.  The sample period for federal funds targeting is September 1977 to 
September 1979, the period for nonborrowed reserve targeting is September 1979 
to September 1982, and the period for borrowed reserve targeting is September 
1982 to  December 1984.  Data presented in  this table are Chi-squared 
statistics with 3 degrees of  freedom. 
b.  Reject the null  hypothesis of  no-change in  structure at a 5 percent 
critical  level. 
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